Essay PART I. by Charles H. Carver

Conceiving the instantiation [finish]

Copyright © Charles H. Carver; Eye and Mind Studio 2005

IV. Concluding Remarks (Part I)

The goal of Part I of this two-part essay has been to render for the reader a loose description and a general criticism of a few key points at the heart of the philosophical debates currently at play in consciousness studies dialogues. By no means is this critique comprehensive or based on direct empirical research, however, I would suggest that it’s main thrust speaks to much that has been overstated as being “empirically based” in the growing list of publications on the subject of consciousness.

Continue To PART II of same ESSAY

References:

Bermudez, J.L, Marcel, A., and Eilan, N., (editors 1995) The Body and The Self.

Damasio, Antonio, (1999), The Feeling of What Happens.

Damasio, Antonio, (2003). Looking For Spinoza.

Deacon, Terrence, (1997), The Symbolic Species: the co-evolution of language and the brain.

Dennett, D.C., (2002), “How Could I Be Wrong?; How Wrong Could I Be?; Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, No. 5-6, pp 13-16

Dennett, D.C., (2002), “Who’s on First?; Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10, No. 9-10, pp 19-30.

Edelman, G. and Tononi, G. (2000), A Universe of Consciousness.

Kandel, E.R., Schwartz, J.H. and Jessel, T.M., (2000) Principles of Neural Science.

Langer, Susanne K. (1942/1993), Philosophy in a New Key, A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art.

Llinas, R. and Churchland, P.S. (editors 1996), The Mind-Brain Continuum.

Mausfeld, R. (2002), “The Physicalist Trap in Perception Theory”, Perception and The Physical World.

Merleau-Ponty, M., (1945/1965) Phenomenology of Perception.

Merleau-Ponty, M., (1947/1965) The Primacy of Perception.

Shear, J., (editor 1995) Explaining Consciousness.

Thompson, E., (1995) Colour Vision: A Study in Cognitive Science and The Philosophy of Perception.

Varela, F.J., Thompson, E. and Rosch E., (1996), The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience.